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A DOOR LEFT OPEN? NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORA TION V. MORGAN AND ITS EFFECT ON POST-FILING
DISCRETE ACTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUITS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are an employer and have been sued by one of
your employees, T, who is an African-American supervisor at your
company. T claims he was retaliated against because he participated as
a witness in an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) proceeding in
2003. The complaint filed by T alleges that you have engaged in a
"discrete act"' of retaliation for his EEO participation, which is a pro-
tected activity under Title VII.
2
You soon learn that T plans to amend his complaint to include
fourteen additional discrete acts. T alleges he was denied seven pro-
motion opportunities, five of which were given to less qualified white
males, and told by his supervisor that because he was in the "dog-
house," his opportunities for promotion would be limited for some
time. Further, T claims he was denied training on three occasions,
which made him less eligible for certain promotions, and denied de-
tails3 on four occasions.
1. Discrete acts have been characterized as denial of training, "termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire." Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan (Morgan), 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Courts have subsequently ex-
panded this list. See, e.g., Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980)
(denying tenure to college professor); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
554 (1977) (forcing a female employee to resign because she violated a policy pro-
hibiting marriage); Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2005)
(refusing to grant vacation requests, requiring plaintiff to obtain medical tests by her
own physician, leaving negative performance evaluations in plaintiffs personnel
file, and instructing plaintiff to enter work site through a back gate); Lyons v. Eng-
land, 307 F.3d 1092, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying favorable assignment of details).
2. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
3. Details are opportunities to temporarily work at a higher level position in
order to gain experience needed for promotions. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1101.
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You are aware that prior to this lawsuit, T had filed a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4 However,
that charge only complained of one specific discrete act of retaliation,
a lower than usual performance evaluation in late 2004. You want to
resolve the lawsuit with T, but you have a problem. Depending on
which federal judicial circuit in which your business resides and
where T decides to file suit, you can be held liable for a different
number of the charges brought by T.
Federal jurisdiction is a prerequisite to filing a Title VII claim.5 In
order to establish jurisdiction for a discrimination or retaliation claim
in federal court, a plaintiff must "exhaust his or her administrative
remedies before seeking adjudication of a Title VII claim.",6 To con-
sider the administrative remedies exhausted, a plaintiff must file a
charge with the EEOC within the requisite charge-filing period, either
180 or 300 days after the discrete act occurred; this gives the EEOC a
chance to investigate the charge. 7
Prior to National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,8 the Su-
preme Court had not addressed the circumstances required for a Title
V11 9 plaintiff to file suit on discrete acts that occurred outside the
charge-filing period.' 0 In Morgan, the plaintiff, Abner Morgan, was an
African American who had been employed by Amtrak for five years. 11
After he was terminated, he filed a charge with the EEOC alleging he
was subjected to racial discrimination and retaliation repeatedly dur-
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC, comprised of a
five-member panel appointed by the President, to interpret and administer Title
VII's provisions. JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKER, JR., THE LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 17 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2001).
5. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1103-04.
6. Id. at 1103 (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
7. Id. at 1104; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000); see also U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n, Filing a Charge qf Employment Discrimination [herein-
after Filing a Discrimination Charge], http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview
_charge-filing.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
8. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2000).
10. Vincent Cheng, National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan: A
Problematic Formulation of the Continuing Violations Theory, 91 CAL. L. REv.
1417, 1423 (2003).
11. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105.
498 [Vol. 43
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ing those five years. 12 The Court unanimously held that a plaintiff is
barred from "recovery for discrete acts of discrimination and retalia-
tion" that do not occur within the statute of limitations period required
by Title VII, in this case 300 days. 13 The Court's holding applied to
facts that involved discrete acts that occurred prior to the initial EEOC
complaint. 14 Thus, the door has been left open for circuit courts to dis-
agree on how, if at all, the application of the Court's holding in Mor-
gan should be applied to post-filing discrete acts.
Since Morgan was decided in 2002, the circuit courts have
reached different conclusions on whether a plaintiff must first exhaust
his or her administrative remedies as applied to post-filing discrete
acts before he or she is allowed to seek recovery and hold the em-
ployer liable for damages in federal court. Thus, a circuit split has de-
veloped between those courts that believe the administrative exhaus-
tion principles the Morgan Court applied to pre-filing discrete acts
should similarly apply to discrete acts occurring after the filing of an
administrative charge15 and those courts that believe this standard is
too rigid to promote the policy goals underlying Title VII. 16 The con-
fusion over the application of Morgan has gone as far as creating a
split within the Sixth Circuit at the appellate court level and the Third
Circuit at the district court level. 
17
This Comment addresses the issues underlying this circuit split
and proposes a new standard under which future cases should be con-
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 114.
15. The Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits subscribe to this
view. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
16. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and the EEOC subscribe to this
view. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
17. For splits in the Sixth Circuit, see Delisle v. Brimfield Township Police De-
partment, 94 F. App'x 247, 252-54 (6th Cir. 2004), Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47
F. App'x 716, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2002), Mullins v. Potter, No. 04-72966, 2005 WL
3556198, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2005), and Jordan v. U.S. Department of
Education, No. 1:05CV1066, 2006 WL 1305073, at *1-2, 5 (N.D. Ohio May 10,
2006). For splits in the Third Circuit, see Patsakis v. Eastern Orthodox Foundation,
No. 04-1662, 2006 WL 2087513, *7 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2006), Allen v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 03-CV-3497, 2005 WL 2179009, at *10-11 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 6, 2005), and Crumpton v. Potter, 305 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474-76 (E.D. Pa.
2004).
3
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sidered, taking into account the policy and intent of Title VII and the
policy arguments of both employers and employees involved in this
type of suit. Part II of this Comment discusses a brief history of the
EEOC and the purpose, goals, and procedural requirements, including
the administrative exhaustion requirement, embodied in Title VII. Part
III discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan. Part IV com-
ments on the current state of the law as applied to the exhaustion re-
quirement for post-filing discrete acts and the circuit split that has de-
veloped since Morgan. Part V investigates the impact of the circuit
split on employers and employees and the policy considerations on
both sides of the issue. Part VI proposes a consistent and workable
standard to address future claims regarding post-filing discrete acts.
This standard is a middle ground between the two viewpoints that
takes into account the arguments of the various circuits and the impli-
cations for both employers and employees discussed in Parts IV and
V. Finally, Part VII concludes with the application of the proposed
standard to the opening hypothetical and its impact on that case.
II. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
AND TITLE VII
A. History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
focused on eliminating the workplace discrimination brought to the
forefront during the civil rights protests in the early 1960s. 18 Congress
intended the EEOC to be "the lead enforcement agency in the area of
workplace discrimination."'1 9 However, when first created, the EEOC
lacked real enforcement authority because it only had the power to
"receive, investigate, and conciliate complaints." 20 By 1971, many had
come to see the EEOC as a "toothless tiger" because discrimination
was still rampant in both the public and private sector, and minorities
were still struggling to make significant inroads against the entrenched
18. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Pre 1965: Events Leading to the
Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/aboutecoc/35th/pre1965/index.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2007).
19. Id.
20. Id.
500 [Vol. 43
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white male majority.21 As a result, Congress conducted public hear-
ings to consider potential amendments to Title VII. 22 After the hear-
ings, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
197223 to give the EEOC its "teeth"--power to litigate against public
and private employers and labor unions.24 With the changes in place,
the EEOC was better suited to promote the Congressional intent of Ti-
tle VII.
B. The Purpose and Goals of Title VII
The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196425 is con-
sidered a "watershed development in the national commitment to
making equality in the workplace a reality," 26 and a "landmark in em-
ployment discrimination legislation." 27 Title VII prohibits an em-
21. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, The 1970s: The "Toothless Ti-
ger" Gets Its Teeth A New Era of Enforcement [hereinafter Toothless Tiger],
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1970s/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
22. Id.
23. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).
24. Toothless Tiger, supra note 21. There were five major provisions of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972:
[the] EEOC received litigation authority to sue nongovernmental 'respon-
dents[,]' employers[,] unions, and employment agencies; [the] EEOC
could file pattern or practice lawsuits; Title VII coverage was expanded to
include Federal Government and state and local governments, as well as
elementary, secondary, and higher educational institutions; [t]he number
of employees needed for Title VII coverage over employers was reduced
from 25 to 15; and [t]he Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating
Council was established, composed of [the] EEOC, the Departments of
Justice and Labor, the Civil Service Commission, and the Civil Rights
Commission to 'maximize effort, promote efficiency, and eliminate con-
flict, competition, duplication and inconsistency' among the various fed-
eral programs.
Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2000).
26. Tara-Ann Topputo, In Opposition to Applying the Continuing Violation
Doctrine to Hostile Work Environment Claims: National Railroad Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), 28 U. DAYTON L. REv. 449, 452 (2002) (quoting
Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
A Brief Updated View qf the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 669 (2000)).
27. Michael W. Roskiewicz, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps
5
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ployer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the
employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.28 The statute
provides two main theories for recovery: disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact.29 The statute also protects employees from discrimina-
tion in the form of retaliation for participation in an EEO protected ac-
tivity or opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by Title
VII. 30 The goal of Title VII was to rectify past and prevent future
workplace discrimination and to provide a remedy for economically
injured employees. 31 Title VII sought to accomplish this goal by pro-
viding economic and injunctive relief to injured employees, remedial
incentives aimed at getting employers to eliminate discriminatory em-
ployment practices.
32
C. The Procedural and Administrative Exhaustion
Requirements of Title VII
Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust his or her administrative
remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a claim for discrimi-
nation or retaliation in federal court.3 3 To satisfy this requirement,
plaintiffs must file a charge with the EEOC within the statutory filing
period.34 The exhaustion requirement plays an important role of en-
couraging settlement through conciliation and voluntary compliance
during administrative proceedings, which "would be defeated if a
complainant could litigate a claim not previously presented to and in-
vestigated by the EEOC. 35
from the Civil Rights Act qf 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies ,for Employment Dis-
crimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 391 (1993).
28. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29. See § 2000e-2(a)(1) (covering disparate treatment); § 2000e-2(a)(2) (cover-
ing disparate impact).
30. § 2000e-3(a).
31. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
32. Id.
33. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing B.K.B.
v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Filing a Dis-
crimination Charge, supra note 7.
34. Lyons, 307 F.3dat 1104; see also § 2000e-5(b).
35. Miller v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 755 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 43
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A plaintiff is only entitled to a hearing on the merits of his or her
claim if the complaint complies with EEOC guidelines.3 6 The re-
quirements an employee must follow for filing a timely charge with
the EEOC are listed in Title VII. 37 An employee must file his or her
charge with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred., 38 However, if the
employee is located in a state with an agency "with [the] authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceed-
ings," the charge must then be filed "within three hundred days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty
days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has termi-
nated the proceedings under the State or local law." 39 Federal sector
employees are subject to an additional requirement; they must contact
an EEO counselor within forty-five days of the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice. 40 "[I]f the matter is not resolved, the employee may
submit a formal administrative complaint., 41 After the charge is filed,
the employee must wait 180 days before requesting a right to sue let-
ter, and once the letter is issued, an employee has only 90 days to file
42a lawsuit.
36. "There are substantive elements that must be met for a charge under Title
VII to be valid: 1) it must be timely; 2) it must be filed by a covered person claiming
to be aggrieved, a person filing on behalf of such an aggrieved person, or a member
of the Commission; 3) it must be filed against a covered respondent: an employer, a
union, an apprenticeship training program, or an employment agency; 4) it must al-
lege discrimination on a basis covered by Title VII: race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or retaliation; and 5) it must allege an issue, i.e. an adverse employ-
ment action." Topputo, supra note 26, at 480 n.31 (citing Kathryn Doi, Equitable
Modification of Title VII Time Limitations to Promote the Statute's Remedial Na-
ture: The Case for Maximum Application of the Zipes Rationale, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 749, 751, 754 n.29 (1985)).
37. See § 2000e-5(e)(1).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Filing a
Charge, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/howtofil.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2006).
41. Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).
42. Doi, supra note 36, at 752. EEOC guidelines require the issuance of a right
to sue letter upon a finding of no reasonable cause, a failure of the EEOC in its con-
ciliation attempts, or if the EEOC does not sue the complaint respondent directly.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19(a), 1601.28(b) (2006).
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Failure to comply with these filing requirements can be fatal to a
Title VII discrimination claim. 43 The Supreme Court has noted that
the time period for filing a discrimination claim represents a value
judgment by Congress "concerning the point at which the interests in
favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones." 44 Therefore, an employee
who files his or her claim outside of the required time period faces the
unpleasant and unfortunate result of the claim being time-barred.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION V. MORGAN
A. The Facts
Abner Morgan was an African-American man hired by National
Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) in August of 1990.45 He was ter-
minated on March 3, 1995, because of an incident with one of his su-
pervisors. 46 The supervisor alleged that Morgan had threatened him,
which led to the supervisor demanding to talk to Morgan in the super-
visor's office. 47 Morgan refused to discuss the incident with his super-
visor without union representation present. 48 When the supervisor de-
nied this request for representation at the meeting, Morgan left the
jobsite. 49 Morgan was suspended, charged with violating company
rules, and subsequently terminated following a hearing.50
Morgan alleged that he was subjected to racially motivated, dis-
criminatory, and retaliatory acts by his supervisors, and that the super-
visors subjected him to a "racially hostile work environment" during
43. Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ly-
ons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002)).
44. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259-60 (1980) (quoting Johnson v.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
45. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 232 F.3d 1008, 1010-11
(9th Cir. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
(Morgan), 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
46. Id. at 1013.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
[Vol. 43
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the entire course of his employment with Amtrak.51 Morgan believed
he was being hired as an electrician; however, Amtrak classified him
as an "Electrician Helper," the first person ever hired with that classi-
fication.52 This resulted in Morgan being paid less than the electri-
cians. 53 He alleged that he continually performed the work of an elec-
trician, and that less qualified whites were subsequently hired as
electricians. 54 Morgan also alleged other acts of discrimination and re-
taliation by Amtrak, most notably being reprimanded and terminated
for refusal to follow orders and being denied the opportunity to par-
ticipate in an electrician apprenticeship program in 1991. 55 Amtrak
also denied him opportunities to attend training sessions that were
scheduled for December 1993 and October 1994.56 When he com-
plained about the training being cancelled, Amtrak never responded.57
Finally, Morgan complained of numerous written warnings for his ab-
senteeism, despite some of these days being excused, and his manag-
ers' use of racial epithets against him, including calling him "boy" and
telling him to get his "'black ass' into the office. 58
On at least six different occasions between October 1991 and Oc-
tober 1994, Morgan sent letters to Amtrak's EEO office complaining
of various acts by his superiors. 59 However, Morgan never received a
formal response from Amtrak to any of these complaints and obtained
only partial redress from his union.6 ° Finally, after his suspension and
just a week prior to his final termination, Morgan filed a charge
51. Id. at 1010-11.
52. Id. at 1011.
53. See id. ("Eventually, Morgan's position was reclassified and his pay
brought in line with that of electricians in April 1992.")
54. Id.
55. Id. This termination was subsequently reduced to a suspension and denial
of pay for ten days, upon Morgan's filing of a grievance. Id.
56. Id. at 1013.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1011-13.
59. Id.
60. Id. The complaints included racial discrimination for being told he stood "a
snowball's chance in hell of becoming an electrician" at his yard, discrimination in
the form of a fifteen day suspension for missing one day of work, discrimination and
retaliation for being denied training three times, and an alleged assault by one of his
supervisors. Id.
9
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against Amtrak with the EEOC and cross-filed with the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing. 61 The charge com-
plained of racial discrimination and retaliation during his five-year
employment with Amtrak because he was disciplined more harshly
and constantly harassed on account of his race.62 Morgan received a
right to sue letter from the EEOC on July 3, 1996.63 Morgan filed suit
in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of California on
October 2, 1996, alleging that he was the victim of discrete acts of
discrimination and retaliation and had been subjected to a "racially
hostile work environment" since Amtrak hired him. 64 While some of
the alleged discriminatory acts contained in Morgan's complaint had
occurred within the three hundred-day window prior to the filing of
the EEOC charge, many of the acts occurred outside of that period, or
before May 3, 1994.65
B. Procedural History
In response to the lawsuit, Amtrak filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing it was entitled to judgment for all of the alleged
acts that occurred prior to May 3, 1994, or 300 days prior to Morgan's
EEOC charge. 6 On September 11, 1998, the district court agreed with
Amtrak and granted the motion in part, holding that Amtrak was not
liable for any acts that occurred prior to May 3, 1994, because the
conduct occurred outside the filing period. 67 The decision was based
on a "reasonable person" test established by the Seventh Circuit that
did not allow a suit to be filed on acts that occurred outside of the
statute of limitations period if a reasonable person would have be-
61. Id. at 1014.
62. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
63. Id. at 106.
64. Id. at 104, 106.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id.
67. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Morgan, 536 U.S. 101. The district court de-
nied summary judgment to Amtrak on the acts that had occurred within the three
hundred-day window; the remaining claims went to trial where a jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of Amtrak. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 107 n.2.
506 [Vol. 43
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lieved he was discriminated against at the time the acts occurred.68
Thus, "'because Morgan believed that he was being discriminated
against at the time that all of these acts occurred, it would not be un-
reasonable to expect that [he] should have filed an EEOC charge on
these acts before the limitations period on these claims ran.' ' 69 Mor-
gan appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.70
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 71 It held
that the acts that occurred prior to, and within, the three hundred-day
window were "sufficiently related" and allowed Morgan to state his
claim by relying on the continuing violation doctrine.72 The court
based its holding on Anderson v. Reno, where the court stated that the
continuing violation doctrine allowed consideration of conduct ordi-
narily time barred, "'as long as the untimely incidents represent an
ongoing unlawful employment practice."'' 73 The court of appeals con-
sidered each of Morgan's three claims-discrimination, retaliation,
and hostile environment-separately and found in all three instances
that the pre-limitations conduct was sufficiently related to the post-
limitations conduct for the continuing violations doctrine to apply.
74
Based on this finding, the case was reversed and remanded to the dis-
trict court to allow the jury to consider the pre-limitations period acts
not only as background evidence, but also for potential liability on the
part of Amtrak.75 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in light
of the circuit split that had developed over the application of the con-
tinuing violation doctrine.76
68. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106 (citing Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Op-
erations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996)).
69. Id. at 106 (quoting the district court's holding in its application to petition
for certiorari).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 106-07.
73. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999), abro-
gated by Morgan, 536 U.S. 101.)
74. Id. at 108.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 107-08.
11
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C. The Supreme Court's Opinion as Applied to Discrete Acts
The key issue decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was the appli-
cation of the continuing violation doctrine to discrimination claims.
The Court addressed what constitutes an "unlawful employment prac-
tice" and when it occurs for purposes of determining timeliness of
these claims.77 The majority decided to terminate the use of the con-
tinuing violation doctrine as applied to Title VII claims involving dis-
crete acts of discrimination and retaliation, while allowing the doc-
trine's continued use in conjunction with hostile work environment
claims.7 8 In defining "unlawful employment practice," the Court dis-
tinguished between discrete discriminatory acts and hostile work envi-
ronment claims.7 9 According to the Court, "[a] discrete retaliatory or
discriminatory act 'occurred' on the day that it 'happened.' A party,
therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date
of the act or lose the ability to recover for it."'80 It further explained:
Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of dis-
crimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision con-
stitutes a separate actionable "unlawful employment practice."
[Therefore,] Morgan can only file a charge to cover discrete acts
that "occurred" within the appropriate time period.81
The Court also emphasized that discrete acts of discrimination and
retaliation "are not actionable if time barred, even when they are re-
lated to acts alleged in timely filed charges." 82 Rather, "[e]ach discrete
77. Id. at 110.
78. Id. at 122. The decision to abrogate the continuing violation doctrine as ap-
plied to discrete acts was unanimous, while the decision to allow it to continue to be
used for hostile work environment claims was a five to four split. Id. at 104-05, 123.
Further discussion of the Court's holding and rationale for the decision regarding the
continuing violation doctrine and hostile work environment claims is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 114.
82. Id. at 113; see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980)
(denying a professor's timely claim for allegedly discriminatory termination as a ba-
sis to pull a time-barred act, the denial of tenure, into the actionable pre-limitations
508 [Vol. 43
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discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that
act.",83 Additionally, the Court emphasized that an employee's knowl-
edge of past discrete acts would not bar an employee from filing
charges "about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independ-
ently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves
timely filed.",84 Finally, the Court noted that while an employee can
use prior pre-limitations discrete acts as "background evidence in sup-
port of a timely claim," these same acts could not be used as a basis
for independent liability. 85
Contrary to a claim based on a discrete act, the Morgan Court de-
scribed a hostile work environment claim as one comprised of "a se-
ries of separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful em-
ployment practice. '"'86 It explained that the very nature of a hostile
work environment claim "involves repeated conduct," adding that
"[t]he 'unlawful employment practice' therefore cannot be said to oc-
cur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps
years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment
may not be actionable on its own."87 Unlike discrete acts, events oc-
curring outside the filing period may still be part of a single hostile
work environment claim, as long as an act contributing to the claim
occurs within the filing period.88
The Court's holding regarding the use of discrete acts in discrimi-
nation lawsuits was based upon the application of both Supreme Court
precedent and a critical analysis of the statutory language in section
2000e-5(e)(1) of Title 42 of the United States Code.89 The majority
believed that none of the lower courts that had considered the issue of
whether acts falling outside a statutory filing period are actionable had
period).
83. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (allowing treatment of allegedly discriminatory acts as lawful
if an employee failed to file a charge of discrimination within the time allowed, be-
cause the timely filing window for a past discrete act is not reset by the occurrence
of an additional timely discrete act).
84. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 117 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
87. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 117-18, 122.
89. Id. at 108-10.
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reached a solution "compelled by the text of the statute." 90 Writing for
the majority, Justice Thomas noted that the Court had previously re-
fused to alter the filing requirements of Title VII, stating that "strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature
is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law." 91
Thus, the legislature had clearly intended for employees to promptly
file claims of employment discrimination when they imposed what
can be considered a short statute of limitations period as compared to
other types of claims. 92
Justice Thomas believed that the critical language of the statute
was found in section 2000e-5(e)(1): "'A charge under this section
shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlai tful employment practice occurred."'' 93 The Supreme Court had
previously determined that this section "'specifies with precision' the
charge filing requirements a plaintiff must follow when filing a Title
VII claim. 94 Following standard rules of statutory construction, and
giving words their "'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,
' '95
Justice Thomas focused his analysis on the operative terms "'shall,'
'after . . .occurred,' and 'unlawful employment practice."'96 Con-
gress's use of "shall" makes the statute's command mandatory and
impervious to judicial decision; therefore, an employee is commanded
to file his or her charge within a stated time period.97 "Occurred"
means that something happened in the past or already took place.
98
90. Id. at 108.
91. Id. (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 824-25 (1980) (reject-
ing arguments that strict adherence was unfair, or that "a less literal reading of the
Act would adequately effectuate the policy of deferring to state agencies")); see also
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) ("Procedural
requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not
to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.").
92. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 (citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825).
93. Id. at 109 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
94. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
95. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 n.5 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Ed. Enters., Inc.
519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)).
96. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109.
97. Id. (citing Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 35 (1998)).
98. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109, 109 n.5 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
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Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that the statute required an em-
ployee to file the charge "after" the employment practice "occurred,"
thereby giving the employee 180 or 300 days "after" the occurrence to
contact the EEOC.99 Claims filed outside of these time limits will be
barred as untimely. 1
00
The final step in the analysis required clarification of what was
meant by an "unlawful employment practice." 10 1 Morgan argued that a
series of discrete acts could be viewed together to constitute an
"unlawful employment practice" that endures over time as a single
"practice." 102 He contended that the language of the statute did not re-
quire a charge to be filed within 180 or 300 days of each act. 10 3 Again
Justice Thomas turned to the language of the statute to resolve this
problem. Citing section 2000e-2(a), 10 4 Justice Thomas stated that the
statute included numerous discrete acts that qualify as "unlawful em-
ployment practices," but found no indication in the statute that "the
term 'practice' converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful
practice for the purposes of timely filing." 10 5 The opinion reinforced
this argument with citations to Electrical Workers v. Robbins and
Meyers, Inc., and Bazemore v. Friday.10 6 In those cases, the Court had
"interpreted the term 'practice' to apply to a discrete act or single 'oc-
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1561 (1993)).
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id. at 109.
101. Id. at 110.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
105. Morgan, 535 U.S. at 111.
106. Id. at 111-12 (citing Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976) (concluding that the discriminatory act occurred on the date
of the employee's discharge rather than on the date the grievance arbitration pro-
ceeding ended because that was the date that the parties understood the discharge
was final); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that
weekly paychecks that paid less to a black than to a similarly situated white were
individually actionable under Title VII, even though they were related acts)).
15
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currence,' even when it [had] a connection to other acts." 1 7 After this
analysis, Justice Thomas determined that Morgan's claims for discrete
acts of discrimination and retaliation, even though related, were sepa-
rate incidents for which independent EEOC filings would have to be
made and that his claims for acts falling outside of the pre-limitations
period were untimely and no longer actionable. 108
IV. POST-FILING DISCRETE ACTS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Since Morgan was decided in June 2002, there has a been a two-
way split in the circuit courts over the impact of the abrogation of the
continuing violation doctrine as applied to claims based on discrete
acts of discrimination and retaliation. Morgan held that a plaintiff is
barred from recovery for discrete acts that do not occur within the
statute of limitations period required by Title VII.1 °9 The decision in
Morgan was based on facts that involved discrete acts occurring prior
to the initial EEOC complaint filed by the plaintiff. Because the court
did not have before it a case that involved post-filing acts, the door has
been left open for the circuits to reach differing conclusions on the ap-
plicability of Morgan to cases based on discrete acts that occur after a
complaint is filed.
One of the key issues courts have addressed following Morgan is
whether a Title VII plaintiff is required to file an additional EEOC or
state agency charge based on the post-filing discrete acts before re-
covery for those acts can be pursued in a district court suit. Prior to
Morgan, the circuits required administrative exhaustion of claims
prior to filing a suit in district court. This requirement was jurisdic-
tional, and failure to file a timely charge would prevent subsequent re-
view of the claim by the district court. 110 Generally, courts used a
variation of the "like or reasonably related" test to determine whether
post-filing discrete acts were sufficiently related to those contained in
107. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111.
108. Id. at 110, 114-15.
109. Id. at 105.
110. See Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, 111 F.3d 794, 799 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[C]ompliance
with the presentment of discrimination complaints to an appropriate administrative
agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite.").
[Vol. 43
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss2/8
2007] NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION V. MORGAN 513
an exhausted charge such that they too could be considered ex-
hausted.111 In determining whether this standard was satisfied, any
new charge would need to be encompassed within the scope of the
prior EEOC investigation. 112 However, after Morgan, the Tenth, Elev-
enth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that Morgan applies
with equal force to all discrete acts, and that each act requires separate
administrative exhaustion regardless of whether or not it is related to
acts contained in a prior charge.113 On the other hand, the Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and the EEOC hold that Morgan should be
strictly construed and only apply as a bar to recovery for discrete acts
that occurred prior to the filing period, and that post-filing acts can
still be considered exhausted by using the "like or reasonably related"
standard. 114
111. See, e.g., Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that al-
leged employment actions that occurred after a previous EEOC charge was filed
were examined to determine if the action was "like or reasonably related" to the al-
legations of the prior charge)); Green v. L.A. County Super. of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472,
1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC
charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are 'like or
reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge."') (quoting
Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729
(9th Cir. 1984)). The Second Circuit gave a concise definition of the claims it con-
sidered sufficiently related:
1) where "the conduct complained of would fall within the 'scope of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination'; 2) where the complaint is "one alleging retalia-
tion by an employer against an employee for filing an EEOC charge"; and
3) where the complaint "alleges further incidents of discrimination carried
out in precisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge."
Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Butts v. City of N.Y.
Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1402-03 (2d Cir. 1993)).
112. See Green, 883 F.2d at 1476 (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)).
113. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
114. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits: Morgan
Applies with Equal Force to Post-Filing Discrete Acts
The Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, as well as
parts of the Third115 and Sixth116 Circuits, extend the rationale behind
115. The issue of post-filing discrete acts has not been addressed by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit since Morgan was decided. Patsakis v. E. Orthodox
Found., No. 04-1662, 2006 WL 2087513, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2006). However,
with cases being decided both ways in the district courts, it is likely this will happen
soon. For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is falling in line with the
viewpoint of the Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, while the
Western District of Pennsylvania seems to lean towards the rationale of the Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See Allen v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 03-CV-
3497, 2005 WL 2179009, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2005) (finding that the Plain-
tiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the acts forming the ba-
sis for their retaliation claims occurred several months after the EEOC closed its in-
vestigation); Crumpton v. Potter, 305 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474-76 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(finding that administrative remedies were not exhausted for a claim occurring on
November 7, 2002, after the EEOC had issued a final investigative decision on No-
vember 1, 2002). But see Patsakis, 2006 WL 2087513, at *7 (finding Morgan not to
affect post-filing acts and allowing plaintiffs' claim for retaliation to survive because
it grew out of a prior charge and thus should be considered "reasonably related").
116. The leading appellate cases on either side of the issue are Delisle v. Brim-
,field Township Police Department and Sherman v. Chrysler Corp. See Delisle v.
Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 253 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that
Morgan did not address the issue of whether courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
claims based on post-filing discrete acts that are not the subject of an administrative
claim); Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47 F. App'x 716, 721 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
that Morgan's principles relating to pre-filing discrete acts should apply equally to
post-filing discrete acts, and that the same rationale underlying a Title VII claim
should be extended to claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act). Because both of these decisions are unpublished, the Sixth Circuit has yet to
set a solid precedent for post-filing claims. However, several of the district courts in
the Sixth Circuit have since followed the Sherman court and have not allowed re-
covery for discrete acts if they are not separately exhausted. See Jordan v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ., No. 1:05CV1066, 2006 WL 1305073, at *1-2, 5 (N.D. Ohio May
10, 2006) (determining that Plaintiffs claim of retaliatory termination was not prop-
erly exhausted because it was not part of her prior EEOC charge and had occurred
four years after the prior charge was filed); Mullins v. Potter, No. 04-72966, 2005
WL 3556198, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2005) (finding a retaliation claim based
on a failure to promote to not be exhausted and therefore, not properly before the
court because it was not included in the original or amended EEOC charge of dis-
crimination). The Mullins court acknowledged that previously, this claim might have
been considered "like or reasonably related" to the initial charge, but based its deci-
sion on Sherman and Morgan and concluded that Plaintiffs reliance on Delisle was
[Vol. 43
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Morgan's treatment of discrete acts as separate individually actionable
events and mandate that a Title VII plaintiff must file a separate
EEOC or state agency charge for each discrete act of discrimination or
retaliation. Therefore, separate charges are required for post-filing dis-
crete acts. Only discrete acts for which this requirement has been sat-
isfied can be included in a plaintiffs district court lawsuit, and dis-
crete acts can no longer be considered administratively exhausted,
even if they are "like or reasonably related" to prior charges.
One of the leading and most frequently cited cases on this side of
the circuit split is Martinez v. Potter.117 The case involved a United
States Postal Service (USPS) carrier who filed an EEO charge in July
1999 and subsequently sued USPS for unlawful retaliation based on
the previous EEO charge that he filed in 1998.118 During the litigation
Martinez attempted to add allegations regarding a September 2000
reprimand and his April 2001 termination to his case.119 No formal
EEO charge had ever been filed by Martinez for the September 2000
reprimand or the April 2001 termination, and Martinez had not at-
tempted to amend his prior EEO charge. 120
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the impact of Mor-
gan on the circuit's law regarding discrete acts of discrimination and
retaliation. 121 The court believed that Morgan had fundamentally
changed how administratively unexhausted claims would be handled
unfounded. Id. at * 1-2.
117. Martinez v. Potter (Martinez II), 347 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2003).
118. Martinez v. Henderson (Martinez 1), 252 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1227-28
(D.N.M. 2002), aff'd sub nom. Martinez II, 347 F.3d 1208. Martinez alleged that his
supervisor had issued unnecessary letters of warning (internal USPS discipline),
modified his delivery route, and subjected him to continuous "harassment, intimida-
tion, and discrimination," all as retaliation for his first EEO charge. Id. at 1228.
119. Martinez II, 347 F.3d at 1210. The reprimand was for unsafe driving,
which led to another letter of warning and a two-week suspension, and the termina-
tion was for alleged insubordination. Martinez I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-31.
120. Martinez II, 347 F.3d at 1210. The district court held that USPS was enti-
tled to summary judgment on Martinez's claims that were not included in the July
1999 EEO charge. Martinez I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. This decision was based on
a finding that Martinez had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to these
additional claims because no additional EEO charge was filed and the additional
claims were not "like or reasonably related" to the claim in the July 1999 charge. Id.
121. See Martinez II, 347 F.3d at 1210.
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in Title VII cases. 122 The Supreme Court's abrogation of the continu-
ing violation doctrine as applied to discriminatory and retaliatory dis-
crete acts and the decision that each discrete act must be treated as an
"unlawful employment practice" for which administrative exhaustion
is required were the basis for this belief 123 However, the Martinez II
court took the decision a step further when it ruled that Morgan,
which applied to discrete acts that occurred prior to the charge filing
period, applied with equal force to incidents occurring after an EEOC
charge was filed. 124 The decision was based on recent Tenth Circuit
case law. 12 5 Thus, even though a plaintiff in the Tenth Circuit was
previously able to use the "like or reasonably related" test to argue
that post-filing discrete acts, for which no new EEOC charge had been
filed, were administratively exhausted, Martinez II and Morgan fore-
closed that line of argument.
126
The Martinez II decision was guided not only by Morgan, but also
by the court's belief that its application of the rule to post-filing dis-
crete acts was consistent with Title VII's policy goals. 127 Requiring an
employee to file the additional EEO charge puts the employer on no-
tice of the additional violation before a formal lawsuit is com-
menced. 128 Once informed, the employer can attempt internal resolu-
tion of the dispute, which is preferred over time-consuming and
expensive litigation. 129 The court believed notice to the employer was
crucial in this case because USPS could have faced liability for vari-
ous actions by its supervisors, each with a different factual basis and a
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1210-11.
125. See id. at 1211 (citing Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179,
1184 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the continuing violation theory and finding that a
claimant must file a charge after discrete acts occur within the required limitations
period)).
126. See Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (apply-
ing Morgan and Martinez II in declining to review a petitioner's claim that "receiv-
ing an adjunct lecturer versus an adjunct professor position constitutes an adverse
employment action" because this particular charge was not included in her EEOC
complaint).
127. Martinez II, 347 F.3dat 1211.
128. Id.
129. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-35 (1976).
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different functional form, but would only have notice of the allega-
tions from the 1999 EEOC charge. 130 Many of the courts that have de-
cided to apply Morgan in this manner have looked to the Tenth Circuit
for guidance. 131
130. Martinez I, 347 F.3d at 1211. The three key policy reasons stated in Mar-
tinez II employer notice, less costly resolution of claims, and opportunity for inter-
nal resolution of disputes prior to a lawsuit being filed have also been used to sup-
port decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit. See Romero-Ostolaza v. Ridge,
370 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149 (D.D.C. 2005). However, the court in Romero-Ostolaza
also noted that requiring the same administrative exhaustion requirements for post-
filing acts "ensures that only claims [a] plaintiff has diligently pursued will survive."
Id. (quoting Velikonja v. Mueller, 315 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2004). Other Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit cases have cited these and other policy reasons for this take
on the administrative exhaustion requirement. One of the key rationales is that fed-
eral courts should only be burdened with these types of suits when reasonably nec-
essary and when promoting internal resolution of disputes satisfies this goal. See
Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Also, the courts have favored
short deadlines, wanting to encourage prompt investigation of claims in order to
prevent the evidence from becoming stale. See Velikonja, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 71-72
(citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980)). Finally, the District
of Columbia Circuit has noted that the administrative charge requirement provides
the charged party "notice of the claim and [it] 'narrow[s] the issues for prompt adju-
dication and decision."' Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 n.325 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
131. See Casiano v. Gonzales, No. 3:04CV67/RV/MD, 2005 WL 229956, at
*16-17 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2006) (dismissing ten allegations of retaliation for the
previous filing of an EEO charge because only two of the twelve instances of al-
leged discrimination were included in the prior charge). It is interesting to note that
just a month after Morgan was decided, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refer-
enced the Court's decision in EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265,
1271-72 (1 lth Cir. 2002). Although the issue of post-filing discrete acts was not di-
rectly before the court, it mentioned the effect Morgan would have on a post-filing
claim if brought before the panel. Joe's Stone Crabs, 296 F.3d at 1272 n.5. The
court cited the same key language from Morgan as the Tenth Circuit would in Mar-
tinez, inferring that it would find the same way when the issue arose. Id. Similarly,
in Romero-Ostolaza, the District of Columbia District Court granted summary
judgment to the Department of Homeland Security when the plaintiffs' claim for re-
taliatory termination had been raised for the first time in district court and was not
the subject of a new administrative charge or contained in an amendment to an ear-
lier charge. Romero-Ostolaza, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 148-51. The court reasoned that
Morgan's emphasis on strict adherence to legislatively mandated procedural re-
quirements and rejection of the continuing violation doctrine as applied to discrete
acts allowed the rationale to be stretched and applied to discrete acts occurring after
the charge was filed. Id. at 148-49. The judge specifically noted that prior to Mor-
gan, most courts would have found a retaliation claim for filing an EEO charge of
21
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B. The EEOC and the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: The
Continued Use of the Sufficiently Related Test and
the Strict Application of Morgan
The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and the EEOC believe
that the holding in Morgan regarding charges filed for discrete acts
should be strictly construed. Thus, pre-charge filing acts occurring be-
fore the charge-filing period of 180 or 300 days prior to the charge are
barred from inclusion in the plaintiff s district court case because they
are not administratively exhausted. However, relief for post-filing dis-
crete acts can be pursued without further administrative filing if the
acts are "like or reasonably related" to those contained in the original
EEOC complaint. 132 The exact definition of "like or reasonably re-
lated" varies between the circuits that subscribe to this view. 133 How-
ever, the following three factors are consistently used to determine if
the standard is met, and if the post-filing discrete act falls within any
of them, the act can be considered administratively exhausted:
1) [whether] "the conduct complained of would fall within the
'scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be ex-
pected to grow out of the charge of discrimination'; 2) [whether]
the complaint is "one alleging retaliation by an employer against an
employee for filing an EEOC charge"; and 3) [whether] the com-
discrimination to be "like or reasonably related" to the first charge, and thus, admin-
istratively exhausted; however, this was no longer the case. Id. at 148. The District
of Columbia District Court has held in other cases that subsequent similar acts in-
cluded in amendments to EEO charges were properly exhausted because this satis-
fied the notice requirements the courts deemed necessary for employers to have. See
Velikonja, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 74; Bowie v. Ashcroft, 283 F. Supp. 2d 25, 34 (D.D.C.
2003).
132. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
133. Compare Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (defining
like or reasonably related as "sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge"
(quoting Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1402
(2d Cir. 1993))), with EEOC v. Farmer Bros., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (de-
fining like or reasonably related as those allegations falling "within the scope of the
EEOC's actual investigation or an 'EEOC investigation which can reasonably be
expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination"' (quoting Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920
F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990))).
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plaint "alleges further incidents of discrimination carried out in pre-
cisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge."
' 134
These circuits still hold the plaintiff to some form of the administra-
tive exhaustion requirement; 135 however, by using the "like or rea-
sonably related" test for post-filing acts, they are continuing the juris-
prudence that the majority of the circuits used prior to the Morgan
decision. The continuation of the use of the pre-Morgan standard is
consistent with the viewpoint of the EEOC, which believes that Mor-
gan does not affect post-filing discrete act claims. 
136
In July 2005, the EEOC updated its compliance manual to com-
ment on the current state of the law regarding the timeliness require-
ments for filing charges based on discrete acts. 137 In the update, the
EEOC discussed the effect that Morgan had on these filing require-
ments and concluded that "[a] timely charge also may challenge inci-
134. Terry, 336 F.3d at 151 (quoting Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402-03). The decision
in Terry, which was decided more than a year after Morgan, made no reference to
Morgan or that Morgan could possibly have an effect on post-filing discrete act
claims. As a result, other district court cases in the Second Circuit have continued to
apply the three-factor standard used prior to Morgan and have not addressed the
possible implications of Morgan on post-filing act claims. See Mathirampuzha v.
U.S. Postal Serv., No. 3:04CV841 (JBA), 2006 WL 2458669, at *4-5 (D. Conn.
Aug. 21, 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs hostile work environment and retaliation claims
because they were not reasonably related to the underlying charge of national origin
discrimination, but continuing to use the three-factor test from Terry); Fleming v.
Verizon N.Y., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing plain-
tiffs retaliation claims because under the three-factor test from Terry, they cannot
be seen as reasonably related, and therefore, cannot have been administratively ex-
hausted); Whitlow v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n of W. N.Y., 420 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100-02
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding constructive discharge and harassment claims to be rea-
sonably related to EEOC charge because they could be "expected to stem from the
matters set forth" in it).
135. See Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732
F.2d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that for claims which "are not so closely re-
lated that agency action would be redundant, the EEOC must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to consider [the] dispute before [a] federal suit[] [is] initiated," thus an addi-
tional EEOC charge is required).
136. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE
MANUAL SECTION 2: THRESHOLD ISSUES § 2-IVC (2005) [hereinafter EEOC
MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-IV-C.
137. Id.
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dents that occur after the charge is filed., 138 The commission noted
this position was consistent with the view held by the Second, Fourth,
and Eighth Circuits prior to Morgan and pointed out that Morgan had
no effect on those decisions. 139 The commission discussed the coun-
tervailing view that was developing in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
in Martinez v. Potter and EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., but de-
clined to agree with those decisions, believing Morgan did not have
the effect on post-filing discrete acts recognized in those cases. 140
Nothing in Morgan suggested to the EEOC that a new administrative
filing would be necessary when prior related acts had already been
challenged in a charge. 141 As support for this belief, the EEOC cited
the majority opinion in Delisle v. Brimfield Township Police Depart-
ment. 142 By taking this view on the issue, the EEOC was trying to re-
duce the number of administrative hurdles that employees would con-
front when faced with a discriminatory or retaliatory work
environment and with an additional claim based on post-filing discrete
acts.
Two notable examples of appellate court cases that continue to
confine the holding of Morgan to the facts before it are Lyons v. Eng-
land143 and Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Missouri.144 In both of
these cases the court continued to use some form of the "like or rea-
sonably related" test to find some of the plaintiffs' claims, not in-
cluded in EEOC charges, to be administratively exhausted. The issue
in Lyons was whether four male African-American Navy employees
were required to file additional EEO complaints after not being pro-
moted by the Navy in 1997 after filing EEO complaints as to allegedly
discriminatory failures-to-promote in 1996.145 The plaintiffs did not
seek EEO counseling or file formal charges as to the 1997 non-
138. Id.
139. Id. at n.186 (citing Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402-03; Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d
584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992); Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir. 1986)).
140. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 136, at n.186.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247 (6th
Cir. 2004).
143. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2002).
144. Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2006).
145. Lyons, 307 F.3dat 1102-03.
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selections prior to filing their lawsuit in 1998.146 The court concluded
that the employees were not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies regarding the 1997 promotions because they "clearly articu-
lated in their charges their theory that the appellee 147 had systemati-
cally restricted the access of African-American employees to positions
at the GS-13 level or above."1 4 8 The court's decision was based on the
belief that the 1997 charge would reasonably be expected to have
grown out of the 1996 allegation of discrimination that was included
in the earlier EEO complaint.
149
The court looked to pre-Morgan Ninth Circuit cases and applied
the policy from these cases consistently to the post-filing discrete acts,
believing that Morgan did not apply in this situation. 150 The court was
influenced by the argument that after additional occurrences of similar
discriminatory acts, requiring employees to restart the administrative
process in order to have their claims considered by the district court
"'would erect a needless procedural barrier,"' even though administra-
146. Id. at 1102-04.
147. The appellee was Naval Aviation Depot North Island. Id. at 1100.
148. Lyons, 307 F.3dat 1105.
149. Id. at 1104. The decision on this issue also rested on the belief that the
1997 claims were consistent with the plaintiffs' original theory of the case as stated
in the factual allegations of the 1996 charge and, therefore, would have been not just
consistent with but also within the scope of the 1996 EEOC investigation. Id. When
considering whether claims are "like or reasonably related," the Ninth Circuit has
also said consideration should be made of "such factors as the alleged basis of the
discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators
of discrimination named in the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is
alleged to have occurred." B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2002).
150. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also reached this conclusion. Delisle
v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x. 247 (6th Cir. 2004). The majority
noted that Morgan did not stand for the proposition that jurisdiction is lacking for
post-filing discrete acts unless new administrative charges have been filed because
that issue was not squarely before the court. Id. at 252-53. As a result, the majority
believed it was able to address the plaintiffs claim for retaliatory demotion for filing
an initial charge, even though the demotion was never the subject of its own charge.
Id. at 250-52. But this view was not unanimous. The dissent stated that Delisle's
demotion in 1999 was a discrete act, and therefore, under Morgan, recovery was
possible only if a second EEOC charge had been filed by the plaintiff. Id. at 260-61
(Batchelder, J., dissenting). Further, according to the dissent, the majority's opinion
was unequivocally barred by the rationale of the Supreme Court in Morgan, and thus
the majority's reliance on the circuit's precedent was erroneous. Id.
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tive exhaustion was generally a prerequisite.151 Further, the court be-
lieved that because EEOC charges are generally filed by laypersons
who are "'unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading,"' they
must be construed with the "'utmost liberality"' when determining
what they should encompass. 15 2 It was these policy considerations and
the determination that Morgan did not squarely address the post-filing
issue that allowed the Lyons plaintiffs' claims to survive. However,
these are not the only policies on which courts on this side of the split
have relied. 15 3
As opposed to Lyons and other decisions on this side of the circuit
split, the court in Wedow took a more limited view of the "like or rea-
sonably related" standard, but nonetheless refused to directly apply
151. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938
(9th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002)).
152. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1104 (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100); see also Love
v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972) ("Such technicalities are particularly in-
appropriate in a statutory scheme [such as Title VII] in which laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers initiate the process.").
153. Procedural barriers could have a chilling effect on discrimination litiga-
tion and thus undermine one of the fundamental goals of Title VII. Therefore, re-
taliation for a prior substantive discrimination claim should always be foreseeable to
the employer and, thus, within the scope of an EEOC investigation. See Delisle, 94
F. App'x at 254. In these situations, a second filing would be redundant because the
employer would have been on notice of a potential additional claim, and the EEOC
would already have had an opportunity to investigate or conciliate the claim. Id.
Two key policy considerations guide this belief:
"[D]ue to the very nature of retaliation, the principle benefit of EEOC in-
volvement, mediation and claims of conciliation, are much less likely to
result from a second investigation" . . . [and] "[r]equiring a plaintiff to file
a second EEOC charge [for retaliation after an initial administrative claim
has been filed] could have the perverse result of promoting employer re-
taliation in order to impose further costs on plaintiffs and delay the filing
of civil actions relating to the underlying acts of discrimination."
Id. at 254 (quoting Butts v. N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1402
(2d Cir. 1993)). The purpose for the retaliation exception is to prevent "rewarding
employers who successfully intimidate their employees into not filing further EEO
charges." Mathirampuzha v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 3:04CV841(JBA), 2006 WL
2458669, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 2006). This rationale removes a barrier an em-
ployee would face when filing a retaliation claim in a circuit that applies the second
factor of the Terry three-factor test for relatedness. See supra note 134.
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Morgan to post-filing discrete acts. 154 The notable difference between
Wedow and other cases was the content of the 1997 EEOC charges
filed by the plaintiffs. 155 Each charge alleged continuing discrimina-
tion and retaliation when the city continued to provide them with in-
adequate protective clothing and inadequate shower and changing fa-
cilities. 156 Both plaintiffs prevailed in a jury trial based on the EEOC
charge and other claims of retaliation. 157 The retaliatory conduct al-
leged by the plaintiffs occurred from 1998 to 2000, after the prior
EEOC filing and the prior charge had not been amended to include
these allegations. 158
Like the Sixth Circuit in Delisle v. Brimfield Township Police De-
partment,159 Eighth Circuit precedent prior to Morgan held that subse-
quent retaliation claims based on a prior EEOC charge were per se
sufficiently related, and thereby considered administratively exhausted
without a second charge. 160 The Eighth Circuit has now "considerably
narrowed" what it considers "like or reasonably related" to prior
EEOC charges. 161 However, while the court narrowed its view of
154. Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 672-73 (8th Cir.
2006).
155. The two plaintiffs in Wedow were both female battalion chiefs in the Kan-
sas City Fire Department and had both been promoted to that rank after a prior dis-
crimination lawsuit filed against the city in 1994. Id. at 666. In the prior suit, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Fire Department had failed to provide adequate protective
clothing because only male uniforms were provided and had failed to provide ade-
quate shower and bathroom facilities because those provided were not private. Id.
While only one of the plaintiffs prevailed in her prior suit, they both were promoted.
Id.
156. Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
157. Id. The city appealed the verdict on the retaliation claims, claiming it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the 1997 EEOC charge did not men-
tion certain retaliatory acts, and therefore, the plaintiffs had not exhausted their ad-
ministrative remedies for those claims. Id. at 672.
158. Id. at 672.
159. Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 254 (6th Cir.
2004).
160. Wedow, 442 F.3d at 672-73 (citing Wentz v. Md. Cas. Co., 869 F.2d
1153, 1154 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also cases cited supra note 153.
161. Wedow, 442 F.3d at 672. Two years previously the Eighth District Court
of Appeals had recognized that "retaliation claims are not reasonably related to un-
derlying discrimination claims." Id. at 673 (quoting Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, after Morgan, the circuit
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which acts are within the scope of prior EEOC charges, it refused to
completely abandon its prior jurisprudence. 16 2 Therefore, a small ex-
ception to the exhaustion requirement was left open to plaintiffs,
"where the subsequent retaliatory acts were of a like kind to the re-
taliatory acts alleged in the EEOC charge, which were specified to be
of an ongoing and continuing nature."1 63
In light of this reasoning, the court of appeals in Wedow affirmed
the judgment of the district court. 16 4 The plaintiffs' 1997 EEOC
charge alleged that retaliation occurred and continued to occur during
the course of their employment, and the allegations in the complaint
were for ongoing retaliation, taking the same form as in the charge. 165
Because the original claim was for continued retaliation and not just
for a specific incident, as in Parisi v. Boeing Company,166 requiring a
second EEOC charge would simply erect a needless procedural barrier
for the plaintiffs. 167 Under these facts, the employer and the EEOC
would already be on notice of this type of claim because the allega-
tions were not close-ended. Although it simply came down to the se-
mantics of the wording in the charge, the Eighth Circuit did not com-
pletely close the door on an exception to the administrative exhaustion
requirement.
further limited the administrative exhaustion exception, finding subsequent refusals-
to-hire to be discrete acts that would require additional EEOC charges because the
prior charge specified a single refusal-to-hire on a specific date. Parisi v. Boeing
Co., 400 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 2005). The court has also held that "subsequent re-
fusals to hire were not like or reasonably related where the EEOC charge identified a
specific time period in which the alleged conduct occurred, and that time period
ended four months before the date on which the EEOC questionnaire was submit-
ted." Wedow, 442 F.3d at 673 (citing Shelton v. Boeing Co., 399 F.3d 909, 912-13
(8th Cir. 2005)).
162. Wedow, 442 F.3d at 674.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 677.
165. Id. at 674. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged being denied the oppor-
tunity to work out-of-class (temporary assignments of higher rank to gain experi-
ence) and denial of tactical shifts (temporarily working as a Safety Officer or Inte-
rior Sector Officer) and that this led to denial of promotion opportunities. See id. at
674-75.
166. Parisi, 400 F.3d at 583.
167. Wedow, 442 F.3d at 674-75.
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V. THE IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
AND IMPORTANT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The ramifications of this issue significantly impact both employ-
ees and employers at the administrative and district court level. Most
notably, where employees choose to file their lawsuit will affect the
jurisdictional basis for discrete acts not included in administrative
charges when the courts determine employer liability and damages.
Additionally, depending on the circuit, employees can face greater
procedural barriers when seeking relief for discrimination and retalia-
tion claims. Because of this, it is likely that employers, especially na-
tional companies, would seek a change of venue to a circuit more fa-
vorable to their position in an attempt to exclude as many employee
claims as possible. To combat this procedural ploy, employees would
need to artfully craft their administrative charge filings and court
pleadings. Depending on the circuit, employees would either be com-
pelled to file an additional administrative charge for any believed dis-
criminatory or retaliatory discrete act which took place after their first
charge was filed, or be taught to include extremely broad allegations,
alleging every type of discrimination and retaliation possible, so that
their later claims would be seen as "like or reasonably related" to their
previous charge. Both of these choices pose problems for the adminis-
trative agencies involved. The agencies would either be unnecessarily
bogged down investigating redundant charges or would waste re-
sources investigating allegations made solely for the purpose of pro-
tecting the employee from having potential subsequent claims dis-
missed if the case proceeded to trial.
Because the filing deadlines for claims based on post-filing dis-
crete acts are not specifically addressed in Title VII, the resolution of
this problem rests on two important questions. First, should the deci-
sion on the continued use of the "like or reasonably related" test as
applied to post-filing discrete acts be guided by strict statutory inter-
pretation, as Morgan evaluated the continuing violation doctrine, or
by policy considerations behind each of the opposing viewpoints?
Second, is there a compelling argument for why a different test should
continue to be used for post-filing acts, when, in Morgan, a relation-
ship test, the continuing violation doctrine, was abandoned for claims
based on discrete acts occurring prior to the charge filing period?
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In light of the fact that the Court in Morgan did not directly con-
sider the implications of Title VII on post-filing acts, the policy con-
siderations behind the opposing viewpoints should take precedence
when determining the continued use of the "like or reasonably related"
test. Consideration of these policies will be the best approach to an-
swering the first question because it factors in the impact on both the
employers and the employees involved.
The decisions coming out of the Tenth, Eleventh, District of Co-
lumbia, and parts of the Sixth and Third Circuits since Morgan
strongly favor the employer. 168 These courts based their decisions on
the consideration of multiple policy concerns. First and foremost, an
additional administrative charge provides employers with adequate
notice of the behavior alleged to be discriminatory or retaliatory by
their employees and provides warning of potential increased liabil-
ity. 169 Sufficient notice allows employers to investigate the situation
quickly, while the evidence is still fresh, and witnesses are readily
available.170 The additional charge also puts the EEOC or agency on
notice of the allegations and provides the necessary opportunity for
additional investigation and potential conciliation of the claim or for
internal resolution between employers and employees.171 This allows
employers to avoid the high cost and time required by litigation. 172
The agency and employer investigatory process is important because
it allows the issues between employees and employers to be narrowed,
allowing for prompt adjudication, and ensures that the Federal Court
dockets are only burdened when reasonably necessary. 173 Finally, if
employee lawsuits were allowed to encompass allegations not in-
168. See discussion supra Part IV.A. These circuit courts hold that many of the
employees' claims were not properly before the federal courts because they were not
the subject of administrative charges, no matter how related they might have been to
the acts contained in the complainants' prior charge. Id.
169. See Martinez v. Potter (Martinez II), 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.
2003).
170. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
171. See Martinez II, 347 F.3d at 1211; Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, 111 F.3d
794, 799 (10th Cir. 1997).
172. See Martinez I, 347 F.3dat 1211.
173. See Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir 1995) (citing
Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 n.325 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see also
Velikonja v. Mueller, 315 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2004).
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cluded in a prior EEOC charge, the investigatory and conciliatory role
of the EEOC would be circumvented, thus depriving the agency of
one of its key functions. 174 All of these policy considerations make a
strong argument for why a new administrative charge is required when
employees want to file a complaint about subsequent post-filing dis-
crete acts in their case.
On the other hand, there are also strong policy considerations un-
derlying the decisions emerging from the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits that are supported by the EEOC's own interpretation of the
effect of Morgan on post-filing discrete act claims. 175 These circuits
take a view that is more favorable to the employee, loosening the ad-
ministrative requirements for employees to successfully bring a claim
regarding post-filing discrete acts in district court. One of the key poli-
cies in the pro-employer cases is the idea of giving employers ade-
quate notice of the claims against them. However, pro-employee
courts find that the filing of a first administrative charge adequate to
relieve employees of this burden. The first charge serves to put em-
ployers on notice of a possible situation regarding a particular em-
ployee and gives employers and the EEOC a chance to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the charge. 176 The pleading requirements
for employees at the administrative level should be no more burden-
some than if they were filing a complaint not covered by Title VII in
district court, where the standard is simple notice pleading. 177 Further,
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claimants are not required
to set out the exact legal theory that they believe entitles them to re-
lief.178 Therefore, if analogized to the administrative charge require-
ment, employees would not have to specify if they were claiming dis-
crimination or retaliation, as long as the proper basis for the allegation
is specified-that they are members of a protected class under Title
VII. 179 Simple notice is all that should be required of employees in an
174. Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1985).
175. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 136.
176. Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep't, 94 F. App'x 247, 253-54 (6th Cir.
2004).
177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure §
303 (2003) (stating that all the Federal Rules require in a complaint is a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief').
178. 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 303 (2003).
179. The five protected classifications under Title VII are race, color, religion,
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administrative charge, and the charge should be construed liberally
because administrative charges are generally filed by laypersons that
are unskilled in the technicalities of formal pleading. 180 If this was all
that was required, employers would still get the necessary notice and
employees would have a much easier time bringing subsequent post-
filing acts into their lawsuit because many more claims would be seen
as "like or reasonably related" to the prior charges.
Requiring employees to file new charges for additional post-filing
discrete acts of discrimination in order to be considered by the courts
does erect additional procedural barriers between aggrieved employ-
ees and judicial relief.181 The courts have recognized the procedural
requirements of Title VII as important, but the exhaustion doctrine
was not designed to "become a massive procedural roadblock to ac-
cess to the courts. Therefore, where the ends of administrative exhaus-
tion have been served ... separate initiation of administrative exhaus-
tion for related post-[filing] conduct is not required." 182 This
roadblock seems particularly inappropriate because the EEOC does
not have to address or actually investigate a complainant's claim for it
to be considered administratively exhausted; the claim simply has to
be filed. 183 In light of this fact, requiring employees to file an addi-
tional charge is a procedural barrier that does not necessarily produce
any potential benefit other than allowing employers to wiggle out
from under potential allegations. Further, it is unlikely that Congress
intended to place such a high burden on employees trying to recover
for workplace discrimination by requiring employees to file a separate
charge for every post-filing discrete act they believe is a violation of
Title VII.
sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
180. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
181. See Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999), abrogated by
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (Morgan), 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
182. Velikonja v. Mueller, 315 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2004) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
183. See Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding that the EEOC's failure to address a claim to have no bearing on
the consideration of administrative exhaustion); cf Martin v. Nannie & the New-
borns, Inc., 3. F.3d 1410, 1413, 1416 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that a plaintiff
succeeded in exhausting her claims reasonably related to the allegation in the EEOC
charge when the EEOC did not complete its investigation).
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Finally, in response to the second question, a compelling argu-
ment can be made as to why some claims should be allowed under a
relationship test and why applying the standard discussed below
would not be a resurgence of the continuing violation doctrine. The
decision in Morgan was based on the idea that Congress intended dis-
crimination claims be filed and processed promptly. 184 The two key
policies underlying this rationale are employer notice and the gather-
ing of evidence before it gets stale. These two policy goals are not as
important when considered in light of post-filing discrete acts. The
Morgan Court did not want to allow the plaintiff to recover from Am-
trak for acts that took place between two and five years prior to the fil-
ing of his EEOC charge. In that situation there was a high risk that
evidence would be stale and of the defendant facing prejudice by be-
ing forced to defend against charges of which it had no reasonable no-
tice.
In most of the cases discussed above regarding post-filing discrete
acts, the subsequent acts occurred either during the investigation of
pending EEOC charges or after the employee had already filed the ini-
tial district court suit. With the discrete acts occurring at these times,
the two policy concerns of employer notice and fresh evidence are not
as critical. First, the employee in question would already have put the
employer on notice with the prior administrative charge, thereby al-
lowing the employer to keep a more watchful eye on the situation and
to have a heightened awareness of the subsequent treatment of the
employee that could lead to additional claims. Second, the employer
would already be in the process of gathering evidence in order to in-
vestigate the claim or to defend the company in the anticipated lawsuit
derived from the first administrative charge. Additionally, since the
employer was put on notice by the first charge, it is likely that the em-
ployer, who is on heightened alert, would be keeping better records
and documenting the course of events between the employee and em-
ployer. In light of these reasons, the underlying policy concerns be-
hind the decision regarding pre-filing period acts are simply not as
compelling when applied to post-filing discrete acts.
184. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109.
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VI. THERE IS A BETTER WAY: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD IN
WEDOW V. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MIssoURi
It is unlikely that both employees and employers will be content
with whatever standard is determined to be most suitable because
some of their policy interests will necessarily be slighted. However, a
consistent position needs to be adopted by the circuit courts or man-
dated by the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue. The determination of
what claims can be brought in a district court suit should not depend
on the circuit in which the case is filed. One possible option, which
portrays a reasonable middle ground, is similar to the standard set
forth by Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Missouri.185 The only excep-
tion to the administrative exhaustion requirement for post-filing dis-
crete acts would be for subsequent retaliation claims that derive from
an underlying discrimination or retaliation charge specifically stating
that the retaliatory behavior was continuous and ongoing. This would
be the only time a post-filing discrete act could be considered "like or
reasonably related" to the prior administrative charge, and therefore,
would be exempt from the requirement of being the subject of an ad-
ministrative charge.
This standard would be consistent with the essential policy goals
on each side of the issue while not completely taking either the hard-
line view of the pro-employer circuits, or the more liberal view of the
pro-employee circuits. It would ensure that employers had notice of
the potential for a subsequent claim and ensure that employees would
not have to file an additional charge in all cases where further dis-
crimination is most foreseeable by both parties-situations in which
there is continuous retaliation for prior EEO activity such as the filing
of a prior discrimination or retaliation charge, participation in a pro-
tected activity, or opposition to an unlawful employment practice.
This standard works due to the nature of a retaliation claim. One
of the key elements of a retaliation claim is that the employee must
have participated in some form of activity protected under Title VII.
186
185. Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 673-74 (8th Cir. 2006)
(retaining a very limited "like or reasonably related" test in light of Morgan).
186. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he
or she engaged in a protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action,
and that there was a causal link between the two. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002); Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d
530 [Vol. 43
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss2/8
2007] NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION V. MORGAN 531
Generally that activity is the filing of a prior administrative charge
which the employer is subsequently made aware of by the administra-
tive agency. Once the employer is on notice of a charge that claims
continuing and ongoing adverse treatment, the employer could not ar-
gue it had no notice of post-filing discrete acts the employee might
also see as adverse, as long as they are based on the same underlying
claim as in the prior charge. If the charge complained of is ongoing
discrimination, not an isolated incident that happened in the past that
the employer might not expect to happen again in the future, the em-
ployer could be liable for future claims without further administrative
charges by the employee. However, those claims would be limited to
discrete acts identical in nature to those identified in the charge as be-
ing continuous and ongoing. Thus, if the retaliation took another form,
an additional charge would be required, but if it continued in identical
form, those discrete acts could be brought in a suit without prior ad-
ministrative exhaustion.
This standard also does not allow an employer to delay an em-
ployee's case getting to court. If additional administrative charges
were required for each subsequent act that fell within this standard, the
employer might be encouraged to continuously retaliate against the
employee with the goal of forcing them to file more and more charges.
This could have the effect of discouraging the employee from pursu-
ing the litigation because of lack of resources, most notably, time and
money. This is an effect that the courts should not allow because it
conflicts with the policy goals of Title VII, which include ensuring an
avenue for aggrieved employees to seek relief for workplace discrimi-
nation.
Allowing employees that truly are being subjected to continuous
and ongoing retaliatory discrimination easier access to the district
courts and providing assurances that when they get there legitimate
claims will not be dismissed on an administrative technicality comport
with Title VII. At the same time, this standard assures that employers
will have notice, prior to the lawsuit, of the basis of potential claims
against them and gives employers a chance to change their ways be-
fore employees suffer further harm. This standard would not allow
employees' discrete act claims not specifically mentioned in the prior
administrative charge to be a part of the suit without additional admin-
765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981).
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istrative exhaustion. However, it would allow ongoing claims of re-
taliation to be included in the suit without unnecessary procedural bar-
riers. This is unlike the continuing violation doctrine, which was de-
signed to cover acts that happened prior to charge filing and to make
discrete acts on which the filing period had already expired timely.
This standard does not make discrete acts that occur before the filing
period timely, rather it simply removes a procedural roadblock to re-
covery for a much more recent and foreseeable violation.
VII. CONCLUSION
If this standard were applied to the hypothetical lawsuit discussed
at the opening of this Comment, the outcome is just. The employer
would not be liable for discrete acts for which it had no notice, the ad-
ditional fourteen post-filing discrete acts that T attempted to add to his
lawsuit based on the original EEOC complaint regarding the single
performance evaluation. First, T had not complained of any subse-
quent poor performance evaluations, and second, T did not allege the
employer's behavior leading to his first EEOC charge was continuous
or ongoing; in fact, it was an isolated event. The employer and the
EEOC only had notice of the single incident in the first charge, so the
EEOC would not have investigated other issues, thus depriving the
employer of notice of additional liability and robbing the EEOC of its
investigatory and conciliatory role. The difference between a negative
performance evaluation and being passed over for promotion seven
times because T was in the "doghouse" is vast. If T knew to contact an
EEOC counselor for the performance evaluation, T should also be
held to know further EEOC contact was necessary for the non-
promotions, what many would consider a more serious retaliatory ad-
verse employment action. However, if T did file a second charge for
the first non-promotion and complained of denial of promotions as
ongoing retaliation for his prior EEOC activity, T would not have been
required to file an additional charge for the other six non-promotions
that followed.
While implementation of this standard would require a change in
the pleading requirements for employees at the administrative level,
the change is not drastic. The federal agency EEO counselors or the
EEOC intake employees would simply have to inform the employees
of the potential effect of how they word their administrative com-
[Vol. 43
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plaints. Employees would have to play a greater role in being aware of
and taking action to protect their rights, and employers would not be
liable for allegations of which they had no notice. This would allow
for a very narrow range of post-filing claims to be included in an ex-
ception to the administrative exhaustion requirement yet would not
force employers to defend against sweeping allegations in a lawsuit
when only on notice of a very narrow administrative charge.
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